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A Russian Reversal on SDI1
John W R Lepingwell
Russian President Bons Yeltsin s announcement on January 29 1992 that Russia was ready to engage in the 
joint deployment of a global system of defense against ballistic missiles marks a radical departure from the old 
Soviet policy towards the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Yeltsin s call for Russian participation in a global 
ballistic missile defense (BMD) system appears to change the complexion of the debate over SDI transforming 
it from a cold war system into a new opportunity for strengthening US Russian ties Yet the situation is not so 
simple Yeltsin s move does change the context of the debate but a careful examination of Russian and US 
interests in cooperation must be undertaken before the full implications of the proposal can be assessed
The analysis presented here suggests that Russian incentives to participate in Global Protection Against 
Limited Strikes (GPALS) stem more from economic concerns than military ones Indeed even within the 
Russian government and military there are substantial disagreements as to whether Russian participation in 
BMD research is desirable Russian support for such a program may be highly contingent upon transfers of 
funding and technology from the US Without such an agreement Russian interest in revising the Anti 
Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty to allow US deployment of a large scale BMD system seems rather unlikely 
while Russian unilateral deployment of a BMD system is not feasible
The Evolving Soviet Position on SDI
From the moment of its announcement in March 1983 the Soviet leadership viewed SDI as an attempt to break 
out of the ABM treaty and establish US strategic superiority This view was reflected in initial Soviet demands 
that the US cancel SDI in exchange for an agreement on strategic offensive weapons But, as the Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) talks progressed SDI gradually lost its momentum and the Soviet side backed 
away from its demands By December 1987 the Soviets were just requesting a commitment to adhéré to a strict 
interpretation of the ABM treaty 2
When the Bush administration took office it reviewed SDI and quietly downgraded its priority while 
Congress continued to limit funding for the program The Soviet Union responded by making a major 
concession on the SDI issue at the September 1989 Foreign Minister s meeting at Jackson Hole Shevardnadze 
agreed to drop the requirement of a formal commitment to the ABM treaty agreeing instead to continue to 
discuss ways to ensure predictability in the development of the US Soviet strategic relationship to reduce the 
risk of nuclear war At the same time Shevardnadze announced the Soviet decision to dismantle the 
Krasnoyarsk radar station that according to US charges violated the ABM treaty3 When the START accord 
was finally signed m June 1991 Soviet objections to SDI had become pro forma and presented no obstacle
After the August coup attempt the change m US Soviet relations and the changing power balance between 
Yeltsm and Gorbachev paved the way for a revised Soviet position In October 1991 in response to President 
Bush s unilateral arms control initiative Gorbachev expressed the Soviet Union s willingness to discuss the 
possible deployment of a non nuclear BMD system and suggested examining proposals for a jomt early warning 
system 4 Yet several of Gorbachev s advisors and some military officers continued to express a strongly
1 Research and writing for this paper was completed in early June 1992 and will be published in Orbts Winter 1991/92
2 For an overview of Soviet positions on SDI and the ABM treaty see Karen Puschel Can Moscow live with SDI? Survival 
January/Febniary 1989 pp 34 51 Jeanette Voas Soviet Attitudes towards Ballistic Missile Defence and the ABM Treaty 
Adelphi Papers No 255 (Winter 1990)
3 See The Wyoming Papers Documents from the Foreign Ministers Meeting Arms Control Today October 1989 p 22
4 Zayavlemye M Gorbacheva po sovetskomu televidemyu Izvestiya October 7 1991 p 1 For a summary discussion of 
growing Soviet interest in early warning information exchange and joint deployment of BMD systems during Fall 1991 see 
Henry F Cooper From Confrontation to Cooperation on Ballistic Missile Defense Armed Forces Journal International 
January 1992 pp 16 17
2negative view of SD I5 The incumbent Chief of the General Staff Vladimir Lobov also supported the ABM 
Treaty and argued that for the Soviet Union to catch up to the United States m BMD technology it would have 
to divert funds that would be better used m the civilian economy6 If Gorbachev evinced a willingness to discuss 
the issue however he did not push forward with any concrete proposals
At the same time clear indications of a Russian as opposed to Soviet interest in jomt BMD systems 
began to emerge One of Yeltsin s top defense advisors Vitaliy Shlykov called for the creation of a joint 
defensive system and a Russian military delegation m Washington also supported such a proposal7 Only after 
Yeltsm took over effective control of the military did the concept become an official proposal
Yeltsin s call for joint US Russian research and deployment of a GPALS type system has triggered intense 
debate within the Russian defense community There is far from unanimous backing for the idea particularly 
from some of the most important constituencies m the military and defense industry Because Russian policy 
on this issue is still not settled the contending approaches and arguments concemmg this issue are worth 
examining in detail for they may illuminate future choices in this area
Redefining Russian Interests in BMD
The new Russian debate over SDI has broken the last remaming doctrinal orthodoxy that missile defense (and 
SDI m particular) is inherently destabilizing The debate also reveals differing views among civilian and 
military strategists that are likely to continue to define and drive the process of creating a new Russian military 
doctrine
The proponents of a new approach to BMD are a disparate group Several civilian analysts associated with 
the Institute for World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) such as Sergei Blagovolm and Aleksandr 
Savel yev have taken prominent stands in favor of the proposal as has academician Yevgeniy Velikhov 
formerly a top science advisor to Gorbachev who has become a Yeltsm advisor8 Their position is important for 
it reveals a new approach to security that seeks to completely renounce the cold war and its after effects and to 
create a new security structure based on U S Russian collaboration
At the core of the proponents argument lies a striking reappraisal of the threat to Russia Rather than 
looking fearfully towards the West these analysts are increasingly concerned with potential threats emerging in 
the South and East9 They note that as a Eurasian power Russia is likely to be drawn into regional conflicts in 
Asia and the Middle East Many Russian analysts are increasingly concerned about the potential spread of 
Islamic fundamentalism from Iran into Central Asia While Russian relations with Iran are improving and Iran 
certainly does not pose an immediate military threat to Russia there is a growing sense of vulnerability and 
nervousness over Russia s southern border as well as the position of the Russian minonty population in 
Central Asia
5 Tass Observer Remaries on New ABM Treaty FBIS Sov October 17 1991 pp 1 2  from Tass October 16 1991 Cheney 
Remarks Upon Arrival, FBIS Sov October 21 1991 pp 4-6 from Sovetskaya Rossiya October 17 1991 p 3
6 Lobov US Surprised by Response to Cuts FBIS Sov October 10 1991 p 1 from Tass October 9 1991
7 See US Proposal of Jomt Space Defense Examined FBIS Sov September 15 1991 pp 67-68 from Tass September 15
1991 Official Views Antimissile System With US FBIS Sov October 28 1991 p 1 from Tass October 26 1991 
Commentary on Disarmament Initiatives Stance FBIS Sov January 3 1992 p 1 from Radio Moscow January 2 1992
Cooper From Confrontation to Cooperation p 16
8 See Aleksandr Savel yev Optimal nyy variant sovmestnoy sistemy zahehity dlya nas SOI Nezavisimaya gazeta February 
18 1992 p 2 Idem Future Arms Talks Disarmament Considered FBIS Sov March 9 1992 pp 2 3 from Izvestiya  March 
5 1992 p 5 Velikhov Kokoshin on Jomt SDI Idea FBIS Sov March 19 1992 pp 5 7 from Moscow News March 22
1992 p 12 Security Economic Gams m Joining SDI Eyed FBIS Sov Februaty 11 1992 pp 5-6 from Komsomolskaya 
Pravda February 6 1992 p 3 S Blagovolm Nuclear Weapons m the Changing World mimeo November 1991 Savelyev 
and Blagovolm are now also associated with the new Institute for National Security and Strategic Studies Velikhov seems to 
have changed his position on BMD rather rapidly see Velikhov Discusses Nuclear Safety Arms Control, FBIS Sov 
September 17 1991 pp 1 2 from Die Presse September 16 1991 p 3
9 See V F Dayvdov XXI vek—stoletiye raketno yademykh pigmeyev? SShA No 2 1991 pp 3 13 and the sources cited m 
footnote 7
3This concern has been fueled by the potential for the proliferation of nuclear weapons and ballistic missile 
technology in the Middle East and South A sia10 The duel between Scuds and Patriots sparked increased Russian 
interest in BMD just as it did m the United States Unlike the United States however which can only be 
threatened by ICBMs shorter range ballistic missiles can reach Russia 11 As the nations m these regions 
improve their rocket technology ranges will also increase and the potential threat to Russia will grow more 
rapidly than that to the United States This provides a strong set of incentives for considering a BMD system to 
defend against non Western threats
Yet this redefimuon of the threat is rather vague and no analyst has yet provided a plausible scenano in 
which an Asian or Middle Eastern state would launch a nuclear strike against a well armed Russia Not stated 
but perhaps equally important in threat assessment is the continuing threat posed by China despite its warming 
relations with Russia it remains the only major military power bordenng the country Furthermore China 
may face its own leadership transition and potential instability m the latter part of the decade
Another concern is that the nuclear disarming of Ukraine and Kazakhstan may not be completed 12 This is 
an extremely sensitive topic however and public calls by high ranking politicians for a BMD system to defend 
against Kazakhstan or Ukraine could ignite a diplomatic storm Indeed the proposed GPALS based system 
would probably provide little protection against shorter range missiles launched from neighboring states
Analysts such as Aleksandr Savel yev also claim that the old arguments against strategic defenses such as 
their potentially destabilizing effects during crises are no longer valid in the post-cold war world They argue 
that a limited BMD system would not be sufficient to prevent a devastating retaliatory strike by a large nuclear 
power (such as Russia) while also pointing out that the system would be under joint control and thus would 
not give either side an advantage13 In short the system s limited capability combined with the new political 
climate would prevent any destabilizing effects
These strategic arguments often become mixed with economic and political issues On the political side 
some Russian security analysts view the BMD proposal as a litmus test for the US Russian relationship 
Yeltsm has stated that Russia considers the United States and the West not as mere partners but rather as 
allies 14 This reflects a world view that sees things in terms of black and white since the two sides are no 
longer opponents they must be allies Given this view there are now no major outstanding differences between 
the United States and Russia and hence no reason not to undertake joint security projects At its most extreme 
this view envisions an East West condominium that would endorse a new collective security approach a policy 
that m turn may exacerbate North South divisions
While many of the civilian analysts stress the changing strategic environment there are other groups which 
may be more concerned with the immediate economic potential of the proposal The 1992 Russian defense 
budget slashes procurement by some 80 percent and research and development by approximately 30 percent15 
Thus the defense industry has a very strong incentive to push for a joint BMD development and deployment 
program in order to maintain its funding 16 In announcing his proposal at the UN Yeltsin specifically pointed 
to the need to prevent an exodus of Russian scientists and the need to convert Russian defense industries to 
civilian or purely defensive tasks17 Indeed the Soviets invested heavily m BMD research and development 
although procurement was limited to the Moscow ABM system
10 See Davydov XXI vek and S Blagovolin Voyna zakonchilas Chto dal she? Kommunist No 6 1991 pp 77 87
11 The Chinese made CSS 2 IRBM deployed by Saudi Arabia for example could reach into the Russian hpjmlanH Based on data m
Janne E Nolan Trappings o f Power Ballistic Missiles m the Third World (Washington D C  Brookings Institution 1991)
p 44 78
12 See for example Aleksandr Savel yev s comments in Future Arms Talks Disarmament Considered p 3
13 See for example A Savel yev Optimal nyy variant sovmestnoy sistemy zahchity dlya nas SOI p 2
14 New York Times February 1 1992 p A5
15 Radio Liberty Daily Report January 22 1991
16 For an argument stressing the economic benefits see Joint Global Defense System Proposed FBIS Sov November 15 1991 
from Moscow News No 40 (October 6 1991) p 12
17 New York Tunes February 1 1992 p 5
4A strong lobby for joint BMD deployment may be found m the rocket and missile sector of the defense 
industry In the wake of START and the rapid decline in the space program rocket producers have an enormous 
surplus capacity They may argue that their missiles and space launch systems would be a cost effective means 
of deploying a space based GPALS system 18 Given that this represents a substantial and very high 
technology sector of the Russian defense industry it may well receive a careful hearing from the Russian 
government
Thus proponents of a joint BMD system range from those primarily moved by new threat perceptions and 
a desire to strengthen US Russian relations to those who have a much larger and more immediate economic 
stake m the proposal But Yeltsin s proposal has not received the full support of the Russian arms control 
community Several arms control advocates still oppose any move towards a joint BMD system They are 
being joined in an odd coalition by conservative military officers who view any cooperation with the United 
States wanly
Civilian opponents of a joint BMD system tend to emphasize the destabilizing nature of strategic defenses 
together with their high cost and the low level of the potential threat They also raise the question of whether 
US and Russian interests are identical and if not what demands Washington might make to allow Russian 
participation in the BMD system 19 To some of these analysts a more realist view of US Russian relations is 
necessary recognizing that the US is unlikely to suddenly embrace its old opponent and engage m extensive 
technology sharing and military cooperation
These concerns are even more prominent among military analysts 20 There are two primary sources of 
opposition ideological and financial First not all of the military fully accept that the US threat has 
disappeared and fear that the creation of BMD systems would threaten die retaliatory capability of the Strategic 
Deterrence Forces (the successor to the Strategic Rocket Forces) particularly after START and any subsequent 
reductions in offensive forces 21 In a fierce critique of past Soviet moves in arms control (including START) an 
article in a military newspaper argued that.
They [the US] are not only speeding up work on the creation of full scale ABM defense but they 
have also started implementing a program for taking out (completely) a potential enemy s state of 
the art ballistic missiles Analysis shows that if they work successfully on the two fronts they can 
achieve the complete neutralization of foreign strategic nuclear forces between the years 2000 and 2005 
It is assumed that the effectiveness of the nuclear missile weapons which we for example will have 
left by then will effectively be zero 22
The article goes on to cite the opinion of experts in the Joint Armed Forces High Command and the 
Russian defense complex who did not want their names to be published in the press to the effect that SDI 
would eventually render Russian ballistic missiles obsolete 23 While this concern with alleged US attempts at 
gaming superiority might seem both anachronistic and simplistic it does appear to reflect a dominant concern
18 Even the military is trying to sell or lease some of its excess satellite control facilities to Western concerns see Craig Covault
Soviet Military Space Center Offered for Commercial Lease Aviation Week and Space Technology September 16 1991 p 
28
19 This position has been taken by Aleksei Arbatov who has criticized Savel yev s analysis see “Arbatov Argues Against Joint 
SDI Program FBIS Sov March 4 1992 pp 1 3 from Nezavisimaya gaze ta March 4 1992 p 2 “Arbatov Critique of Joint 
SDI program Viewed FBIS Sov March 25 1992 pp 1 2 from Nezavisimaya Gazeta March 24 1992 p 2
20 See for example Yeltsin s Jomt Defense Proposal Faulted FBIS Sov February 28 1992 pp 1 2, “Debate on Russian 
GPALS Role Viewed FBIS Sov April 29 1992 pp 3-4 from Krasnaya zvezda April 28 1992 p 3 “Implications of Jomt 
SDI Idea Discussed FBIS Sov April 16 1992 pp 5 6 from Izvestiya April 14 1992 p 2 Proposed Jomt Global ABM 
System Queried FBIS Sov April 1 1992 pp 2-4 from Krasnaya zvezda March 25 1992 p 3 “Case for Jomt Space 
Defenses Rebutted FBIS Sov March 4 1992 pp 6 10* from Krasnaya zvezda February 27 1992 pp 2 3 US Peace Loving 
Intentions Questioned FBIS Sov January 24 1992 pp 4 5 from Sovetskaya Rossiya January 16 1992 p 3 Seen as 
Imperiling Deterrence FBIS Sov February 6 1992 pp 3 5 from Krasnaya zvezda February 4 1992 p 2, Disquieting 
Elements Viewed FBIS Sov February 6 1992 pp 5 6 from Sovetskaya Rossiya February 4 1992 p 3 General Questions 
Yeltsm s Arms Initiatives FBIS Sov February 26 1992 pp 1 3 and from Nezavisimaya gazeta February 14 1992 p 4
21 F Ladygin V mteresakh strategicheskoy stabil nosti Krasnaya zvezda November 20 1991 p 5
22 Case for Jomt Space Defenses Rebutted p 8
23 Ibid p 8
5within the military The highly unusual use of unnamed experts suggests that there is strong disapproval of the 
jomt BMD initiative within the highest ranks of the military Indeed the military press has been 
overwhelmingly negative in its appraisal of the idea a sharp break from its past endorsement of every 
government proposal
A second reason for the military s cool reception to the proposal is budgetary The current budget crunch 
will force a re examination of military priorities and BMD programs are unlikely to come out on top 
Indications that strategic defensive programs (especially air defense) were to be downgraded started appearing after 
the coup and the separate strategic defense service (the Air Defense Troops or VPVO Voyska 
protivovozdushnoy oborony) were to be disbanded 24 While the VPVO s formal dissolution was stalled by the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union and it still is fighting to maintain its role its role as a strong advocate for 
increased funding for strategic defense seems very limited In fact the VPVO s early warning and ABM assets 
have already been transferred to the Strategic Deterrent Forces (SDF) so the VPVO may be out of the BMD 
business altogether 25 Yet the SDF is unlikely to be a strong advocate of BMD for its primary institutional 
responsibility is for the strategic offensive forces
One potential argument m favor of BMD research is that it might produce valuable military spm offs 26 By 
coupling BMD research to higher priority areas such as C3 technology anti armor weapons and even air defense 
systems the program might appeal to segments in the military that are interested m developing weapons based 
on new physical principles 127 Nevertheless budget constraints will prevent any large scale introduction of 
new military technology while focused research in these areas may be preferred to hoping for spm offs from 
BMD research BMD research is likely to be seen as an expensive (and potentially ineffective) luxury
Thus even though some military officers called for jomt BMD research even before Yeltsin s proposal the 
military s attitude has been restrained.28 One important proponent of the concept may be Marshal 
Shaposhmkov the Commander of the CIS Jomt Forces who has endorsed the proposal but even he has not 
campaigned strongly for it When pressed on how long it might take to begin deployment he expressed some 
caution A long time years at least five years or even ten We do after all still mistrust 
one another They hide things and we hide things 29 The new Russian deputy defense minister Andrei 
Kokoshm has also been guarded in his appraisal of the idea emphasizing the role of cooperation m the areas of 
early warning and anti tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) development30
Thus the military is not strongly unified in favor of joint BMD research and some segments within it may 
be strongly opposed to the proposal Given the deteriorating financial situation m Russia and the continuing 
crises created by the disintegration of the Soviet Union the military will be exceedingly reluctant to commit 
substantial funds of its own to a new BMD program when traditional programs are being cut
But the diverse opinions and lack of enthusiasm for the proposal suggests that Russian actions or even 
more concrete proposals are likely to be slow in coming As Savel yev has noted B Yeltsin s statement that 
Russia is prepared to join m the US program for the creation of a global defense system which [sic] clashed 
with the ABM Treaty—a sacred cow for many (if not most) of our politicians military men and diplomats—
24 See John W.R Lepmgwell Gorbachev s Strategic Forces Initiative Dissolving the Air Defense Forces Report on the USSR 
Voi 3 No 49 (December 6 1991) pp 4 9
25 See Yu Maksimov Strategicheskiye sily sderzhivamya Krasnaya zvezda December 7 1991 p 3
26 This argument was made concerning the SDI program in K Dolgov Nuzhen lí pnog na tom svete? Krasnaya zvezda August 
15 1991 p 3
27 See for example Mary C Fitzgerald Soviet Armed Forces after the Gulf W ar Demise of the Defensive Doctrine? Report on 
the USSR Voi 3 No 16 (April 19 1991) pp 1-4
28 Politsyn Interviewed on Global Stability FBIS Sov December 17 1991 pp 2 3 from Krasnaya zvezda December 12 1991 
P 3
29 Shaposhmkov on Combat Alert Status of Weapons FBIS Sov February 12 1992 pp 1 2 from Nezavisimaya Gazeta 
February 12 1992 p 2
30 New Defense Logic Needs Consideration FBIS Sov March 4 1992 pp 10 11 from Novoye vremya No 7 1992 pp 30 31 
Velikhov Kokoshm on Jomt SDI Idea FBIS Sov March 19 1992 pp 5 7 from Moscow News 22 March 1992 p 12
6has for some reason gradually started to fade away And it seems as if the cow —despite its infirmity—is 
gaining the upper hand in this clash 31
The proposal remains on the table however and it raises the question of whether there are sufficient 
grounds for substantial US Russian cooperation in BMD What might Russia have to offer to the United 
States and what might it expect m return7 Are there areas in which cooperative projects are feasible that might 
lead to eventual cooperation in jomt BMD projects9
Areas of Cooperation
Yeltsin s call for a joint BMD system was very vague But we may speculate about what Russia might hope to 
gam from a joint BMD development agreement Most recently the Russian Defense Ministry has indicated 
interest in cooperative programs in three areas joint ballistic missile early warning systems jomt ATBM 
development and jomt BMD research and development (R&D)32 Of these the primary emphasis so far has 
been on the first two which require far less m the way of political and technological commitment
Joint Early Warning
The collapse of the Soviet Umon has fragmented the Soviet early warning (EW) system During the 1970s and 
1980s new large phased array radar (LPARs) were built to upgrade and modernize Soviet early warning 
capabilities While most of the radars are situated m Russia LPARS were also budt at Skrunda in Latvia 
Sevastopol and Mukhachevo m Ukraine and Lyaki Mingechuar (Azerbaijan) The Sary Shagan BMD testing 
range and LPAR radar are located in Kazakhstan33
In theory the EW system forms part of the strategic forces under the joint control of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States (CIS)34 But Latvia is not a member of the CIS and is demanding withdrawal of CIS troops 
stationed on its territory Ukraine and Azerbaijan are intent on creating their own national militaries even 
though they are respecting the agreement on strategic forces While the EW system is now intact growing 
tensions between the former republics could result in the radars being nationalized or used as bargaining chips 
m negotiations over the control of other military forces35
A second factor that might affect the integrity of the current EW network is the growing environmental 
movement in the former republics The construction of the Mukhachevo LPAR was halted m 1990 due to 
public concern over its environmental impact36 Demands for the shutdown of other radars could emerge m 
Ukraine and other former republics These demands could intensify after the elimination of strategic offensive 
weapons on their territory as the emplacement of EW radars may be construed as inconsistent with their non 
nuclear status
These radars form an integral part of the CIS early warning system Indeed the Bush administration has 
recently complained about the linking of these radars to the Moscow ABM system a linkage that it claims is
31 Future Arms Talks Disarmament Considered p 3
32 A A Kokoshm A V Menshikov M L Gerasev and M S Vinogradov Questions of Collaboration Between Russia and the 
USA CIS and USA m the Area of Strategic Defenses Center o f Scientific Research o f  the Committee o f Scientists fo r Global 
Security Moscow February 1992
33 There are also 11 of the older Hen House radars most of which are apparently co-located with the newer LPARs See Stoyamye 
pn Pestryalove Pravda April 4 1990 p 2 The Military Balance 1991 92 (London Brassey s 1991) p 38 also lists 8 
LPARs although it erroneously places the Skrunda radar m Belorussia (Belarus) See Soviet Military Power 1987 (Washington 
D C  US GPO 1987) pp 46 50 William M Arkm and Richard W Fieldhouse Nuclear Battlefields (Cambridge Mass 
Ballinger 1985) p 75 Stephen M Meyer Soviet Nuclear Operations in Ashton B Carter John D Steinbruner and Charles 
A Zraket Managing Nuclear Operations (Washington The Brookings Institution 1987) pp 478-482
34 This was agreed to in documents signed m Alma Ata and Minsk in December 1991 See Soglasheruye o koordinatsiormykh 
institutakh Sodruzhestva nezavisimykh gosudarstva Krasnaya zvezda December 24 1991 p 2 Gorbachev Not To Be 
Supreme Commander FBIS Sov December 17 1991 pp 39-40 from Moscow Central TV  December 16 1991
35 Concern over this possibility has already been expressed by the military see V Shpchenko Oborona suverennykh 
gosudarstv Krasnaya zvezda December 20 1991 p 2.
36 John Lepmgwell Early Warning Radars Debated Report on the USSR Voi 2 No 33 (August 17 1990) pp 11 15
7clearly not consistent with the way the United States has interpreted its own compliance under the ABM 
Treaty 37 The administration s charge has been criticized as outrageously false and reckless ” by Ambassador 
Paul Nitze who negotiated the relevant passage in the treaty38 In fact linking the LPARs to the Moscow 
ABM system is to be expected for it provides important early warning information to the ABM radars The 
Bush administration complaints may however serve to encourage the former republics to sever data links to 
Moscow
If the central command of strategic forces m Moscow were demed access to data from the Ukrainian and 
Latvian radars it could blind the strategic defense forces m the entire western direction While early warning 
satellites would still provide warning the absence of radars would reduce the redundancy and accuracy of the early 
warning system This mtum would make detection of false alarms more difficult While the lowered alert 
status of CIS ballistic missiles reduces the danger from false alarms this would still be a negative development 
from the perspective of both the CIS military and strategic stability as a whole
For these reasons the Russian government and military are very interested in a joint early warning system 
While such measures were first proposed before the breakup of the Soviet Union they appear even more urgent 
now A program of data exchange would undoubtedly help to build confidence while reducing Russian 
dependence on an aging and possibly incomplete BM/EWS system 39 Presumably such a joint system would 
be predicated on the Russians not directly linking it to the Moscow ABM system The system could be based 
upon the currently existing Risk Reduction Centers and could at first simply share processed data with more 
sophisticated data sharing and possibly even joint satellites being developed later A further extension could be 
based on what the Russians call zero echelon warning systems that would emplace monitoring devices near 
missile sites in Russia and the United States which would provide an immediate positive indication of launch 
thus building confidence and adding two to three minutes of warning time 40 The primary benefit of such an 
approach would be its low cost, and the ability to incrementally build confidence and trust over time
ATBM Systems
Soviet interest in ATBM systems increased notably after the Gulf War although the attitude towards the 
systems varied by service Representatives of the Artillery and Missile Directorate pointed out that the Scud 
was based on 1950s technology and was obsolete compared to more modem Soviet designs 41 Soviet 
commentators also emphasized Western analyses indicating that the Patriot was not very successful in 
minimizing damage or destroying the Scud warhead.42
But this downplaymg of the Patriot does not mean that the military is not interested m ATBM capabilities 
On the contrary proponents of the SA 10 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system claim the Gulf war 
demonstrated the need for high technology SAMs and ATBMs able to counter the latest missile technology 
The designer of the SA 10 academician Bunkin has even claimed that it is superior to the Patriot missile 
system According to Bunkin the SA 10 is more mobile than Patriot faster to set up has missiles carrying 
larger warheads and can engage targets at altitudes of up to thirty km In test firings against Lance type 
missiles the SA 10 reportedly displayed a 100 percent hit rate with two of the four targets being knocked seven 
to eight kilometers from their aim point43 Yet these claims must be taken with a gram of salt, for the
37 Soviet Noncompltance with Arms Control Agreements March 30 1992 p 7
38 Paul H Nitze Why is Bush Reviving the Soviet Threat? New York Tunes Apnl 20 1992 p A17
39 For a Soviet argument in favor of such data sharing see Sergei Kortunov Toward a New Pattern of Strategic Relationship 
International Affairs No 10 1991 pp 26 28 US deliberations on this topic are reviewed m Vincent Kieman US Offers Data 
to Soviets Defense News October 7 1991 pp 1 28
40 See Kokoshin et al Questions of Collaboration pp 2 3
41 V Gorbatko General Assesses Scud SS 23 Tomahawk Missiles FBIS Sov January 28 1991 pp 45 46
42 Success of Patriots Linked to Renewal of SDI FBIS Sov February 11 1991 pp 1 2  from Pravda February 11 1991 p 6 G 
Khromov Krupneyshaya afera XX veka Krasnaya zvezda March 5 1991 p 3 G Kostenko Fakt anereklam a Krasnaya 
zvezda June 15 1991 p 2 B Tuzmukhamedov Raketnyy epizod voyny v zalive Krasnaya zvezda June 22 1991 p 5
43 See B Bunkin S 300 effektivnee Petnota Krasnaya zvezda June 27 1991 p 2.
8purpose of these disclosures was to advertise the system for foreign sale 44 While the SA 10 is being deployed 
within the former Soviet Union its ATBM capabilities there are likely to be of little use and Bunkin has 
explicitly denied that it has any capability against longer range ballistic missiles
A similar point may be made concerning the SA 12 SAM system that exists in two versions (SA 12a 
Gladiator SA X 12b Giant) The SA X 12b may have an ATBM capability similar to or even greater than the 
SA 10 but it is unlikely to have any significant BMD capability and does not appear to have progressed 
beyond the testing stage
Nevertheless in ATBM technology Russian industry s capability is at least comparable to that of the 
United States While the SA 10 appears to use less sophisticated electronics the missile and warhead 
technology could be of interest to the United States Since the Umted States is increasing funding for theater 
BMD systems the Russians are clearly aiming to develop joint projects with Western manufacturers as well as 
to sell their own systems abroad
i
Joint BMD Research and Development
The most intriguing possibility though is that of joint US Russian work on a global BMD system Yeltsin s 
proposal was extremely vague on exactly what was envisaged but it is clear that such a program would require 
substantial US Russian cooperation and two-way technology transfer It appears that Russian goals for such 
cooperation would include the following
First it is expected that the US might directly support some fines of research and development as has been 
done with the Israeli Arrow ATBM project Clearly a contract to support BMD research and development m 
Russia would be a lucrative alternative to trying to convert advanced research facilities to civilian research and 
development
Second Russian scientists would not only be able to sell their services or products for hard currency they 
might also gain access to the latest developments in Western science and technology From being disadvantaged 
by Western restrictions on technology transfers through the so called Coordinating Committee (COCOM) 
process they hope to leap to direct participation in the most advanced (and sensitive) new technologies
Third Yeltsin has suggested that the participation of Russian scientists m GPALS research would help 
prevent the diversion of trained personnel into nuclear weapons production for third world countries 45
Fourth the support of these facilities may reduce the growing pressure to find export markets for Russian 
arms including their most advanced ATBM systems
Yet the question remains whether this is a viable or desirable project for the United States It appears to 
have far more benefits for the Russian side although even those benefits are somewhat doubtful
The issue of funding for Russian R&D raises the question of whether there are areas m which Russian 
capabilities would make a substantial contribution Information concerning the extent and capability of Russian 
BMD research is Süll sketchy but given the Russian lag m most cnucal technologies it is unlikely that there 
are many areas where collaborative R&D would yield benefits The SDI office has expressed interest in 
spending up to $50 million for purchasing certain Russian technologies and devices46 This approach is 
straightforward and cames little risk for the US side—there is no investment at risk, nor is there technology 
transfer to the Russian side Yet it is unlikely that such a one sided approach to the problem will suffice 
politically The one way transfer of technology to the United States is already under attack by Russian 
conservatives and the Russian leadership is likely to make two way transfer and funding a condition for ABM 
treaty revisions
44 See Steven Zaloga The Red Patriot at Pans Armed Forces Journal International August 1991 pp 26 27 R Kamiol,
Weapons detailed in export dnve Jane s Defense Weekly December 15 1990 p 1201
45 New York Tunes Februaiy 1 1992 p 5
46 New York Times February 8 1992
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work in certain areas to Russian research institutes 47 Such an arrangement could minimize the problem of 
access to classified information and sensitive technologies It would only work for problems that could be 
easily compartmentalized and m which the Russians have pre existing expertise The benefit for the United 
States would be obtaining expert work at a very low pnce while Russian research institutes would gain hard 
currency funding
A second approach would entail more direct collaboration with laboratones in both the United States and 
Russia exchanging data equipment and researchers In this case the technology transfer and secrecy issues 
would be greater Similar benefits would accrue to both sides and Russian workers would also benefit from 
exposure to cutting-edge US research and equipment
Thus there are some possible benefits for both sides to cooperative R&D Yet the areas m which such 
cooperation is beneficial may be very limited There are also great difficulties with technology transfer and on 
both sides there are significant interests in limiting it
Within Russia there are substantial bureaucratic and even ideological obstacles to cooperation For 
example in late 1990 the US Department of Defense arranged to purchase a Topaz nuclear reactor designed by 
Soviet scientists to provide a long lasting power source for deep-space probes In the Soviet Union a furor 
erupted when some newspapers reported that the Topaz was to be used for SDI research The conservative 
military deputy Colonel Nikolai Petrushenko used the issue to assault then Foreign Minister Shevardnadze 
accusing him of mcompetence for not being aware of the sale 48 While such sentiments may be heard less often 
now some responses from the military to Yeltsin s proposal show a reluctance to sell military technology to 
the West or at least a fear that Russia will be short changed in the process 49 That there are bureaucratic 
obstacles and perhaps also some lingering mistrust on the US side is suggested by the continuing delays m 
approving the import of the reactor
From a US perspective there are lingering problems with military technology transfer to Russia First 
information or technology transferred to Russia could m turn be leaked to other parties unless adequate 
safeguards were somehow imposed Second the future of the democratic government m Russia is itself very 
uncertain as even President Yeltsin has acknowledged Cooperation on sensitive military technologies under 
such conditions appears a highly risky endeavor
Finally the impact on arms trade and proliferation must be weighed Yeltsin implied that employing 
Russian scientists on BMD (especially if paid by US standards) would keep them from emigrating and helping 
third world countries with their nuclear and conventional arms programs Thus he is playing to the West s fear 
concerning proliferation
But a joint BMD research program would not help reduce the risk of proliferation A joint BMD system 
would be non nuclear thus former nuclear weapons designers may not be the best qualified scientists to work on 
it nor would it make sense to shift their institutes over to work on BMD technologies Indeed the Russian 
nuclear weapons laboratones (hd not work on BMD technologies and the International Center for Science and 
Technology is being set up to promote the conversion of these facilities to civilian R&D50
The program also would not greatly reduce the strong incentives for the Soviet arms industry to sell arms 
abroad in order to generate desperately needed cash In the worst case scenano Russian arms mdustnes could 
participate in both sides of a third world arms race legal or illegal trade m ballistic missile equipment or know
47 Some US corporations are already creating links with Russian scientists m the civilian sector along these lines as is the 
Department of Energy which is funding thermonuclear fusion research
48 The critics were drawn from the Soyuz group see Depubes Cnbcism of Foreign Ministry Reported FBIS Sov November 29 
1990 pp 41-42 from Literaturnaya Rosstya No 45 (November 12 1990) pp 18 19 Ya Makusev Sovetskiye yademnye 
reaktory dlya voyennykh sputmkov SShA? Krasnaya zvezda December 13 1990 p 4 Academician Demes Topaz Reactor 
SDI Role FBIS Sov March 1 1991 pp 1 2 from Izvestiya February 23 1991 p 6 William J Broad US Hunts Big 
Bargains as Soviets Start to Sell Once Secret Technology New York Tunes November 4 1991 pp 1 7
49 See for example Imphcabons of Joint SDI Idea Discussed p 6 Debate on Russian GPALS Role Viewed p 4
50 Dunbar Lockwood Intemabonal Center Designed to Limit Bram Dram Arms Control Today March 1992 p 24
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how could drive demand for ATBM systems such as the SA 10 While the impact of a ballistic missile offense 
defense race m the third world would be less than a comparable race between the United States and Soviet Union 
it still might have potentially destabilizing effects
Yeltsin s jomt BMD proposal would have only a limited impact on some of the most troublesome issues 
now confronting his country It would have little impact on the potential problem of a brain dram to third 
world countries and it could even delay the conversion of some facilities to civilian R&D and production The 
United States might gam some technologies inexpensively while Russia could gam access to some US 
technology but these benefits are likely to be very limited and could entail substantial costs m overcoming 
bureaucratic barriers
Revising the ABM Treaty7
Yeltsin s call for a joint BMD system also raises serious questions concerning the future of the ABM treaty 
regime Both the 1991 Ballistic Missile Defense Act and the more ambitious GPALS plan would require either 
extensive revision or abrogation of the ABM Treaty as would deploying a joint BMD system In his speech to 
the UN Yeltsin again reiterated his opposmon to SDI but what he opposes is not so much the technology as 
SDI s Cold War legacy From the Russian perspective SDI was conceived as a system onented towards a now 
non existent Soviet threat Yeltsin is arguing against GPALS and against ABM treaty revision unless Russia is 
cut m for a piece of the action In essence he may hold GPALS hostage if the United States wants Russian 
agreement to treaty revision it may have to accede to Russian participation Otherwise any US government 
attempting to revise the treaty will run into Russian opposition hampering attempts to get it through 
Congress
Thus the Russian turnabout on SDI is not completely unconditional A US unilateral deployment of 
GPALS or a more limited ground based BMD system is likely to meet strong Russian opposition But apart 
from diplomatic protests a major Russian reaction seems improbable because Russia is unlikely to have the 
technological or financial means to create its own defense system As before it is more likely to take 
countermeasures that would reduce the system s effectiveness against strategic offensive weapons On the 
diplomatic front however any US decision to unilaterally deploy a BMD system would probably slow or halt 
further negotiations for bilateral nuclear weapons reductions
The ongoing Russian debate over BMD also illuminates some important new aspects of Russian defense 
decision making Some elements m the military are no longer closely following the government s Ime and are 
quite openly criticizing Yeltsin s policy This gives evidence of the strong persistence of traditional thinking 
within the Russian military that might impede progress in further reduction of offensive arms as well The 
debate reveals a troubling tendency to assume that if you re not with us on joint BMD research you re against 
us The sense is that if the United States does not immediately endorse Russian participation in SDI it 
indicates US bad faith and proves that the United States is seeking to exploit Russian weakness This tendency 
may hamper attempts to build cooperative programs step by step building confidence and cooperation along the 
way
Does Yeltsin s call for joint BMD system research and deployment change the nature of the debate over 
SDI7 In some ways it does It opens the opportunity for re negotiating the ABM treaty to allow GPALS 
deployment But, although the Russian government is not an implacable foe of SDI its acceptance appears to 
be highly conditional To attempt to recast GPALS as a jomt BMD system with Russia could mcrease the 
cost even while raising troubling military technology transfer issues
Even if Russian acceptance of treaty revisions is forthcoming at a minimal political and economic cost it 
does not essentially change the arguments for the GPALS system which is onented against limited third world 
strikes In fact, the political cooperation that makes a joint BMD system conceivable also opens other less 
difficult avenues of cooperation that could reduce the need for such a system Russian experts have shown 
interest in simple measures such as post launch destructive action link (DALs) systems and lowered alert rates
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that could reduce the chance of an accidental launch51 Similarly despite some recent setbacks the Russian 
government may be amenable to Western entreaties to more strictly enforce the Missile Technology Control 
Regime (MTCR) If the twin dangers of accidental launch and proliferation could be reduced part of the need for 
GPALS would also be reduced
Thus Yeltsin s proposal does not provide a strong set of new arguments for GPALS Russian opposition 
to US BMD deployment can no longer be considered a given but neither can Russian support Cooperation m 
some areas may be feasible but the political stability and shared interests necessary to undertake a major joint 
program are absent Russian policy on BMD may also undergo more shifts as contending groups witlun the 
Russian government advance their own agendas A United States unilateral move to deploy BMD systems could 
even strengthen the hand of conservative military officers who continue to see a US threat to Russia Given 
this uncertainty a US approach that combines cooperative work m early warning together with a restrained 
approach to BMD development together with support for Russian defense industry conversion would appear to 
strike the best balance
51 See New Defense Logic Needs Consideration p 11
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